The Kadizadelis
The Rise and Fall of an Islamic Revivalist Movement in the Ottoman Empire

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Table of Contents

Introduction

Birgivi's Islamic Response to the Crises facing the Ottoman State

A range of challenges and crises, both external and internal, confronted the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the seventeenth century, several of which would worsen and plague the empire throughout the century. By 1606 the Ottomans had concluded their long war with the Habsburgs only to be militarily challenged by internal rebellions led by provincial governors in Anatolia and Syria, as well as the initial years of a war with the Safavids that would be fought intermittently until 1639.[1] From the death of Süleyman I, the political power of the empire was decentralized as the influence of competing factions and groups within and outside of government increased, including the power and influence of the Valide Sultan that was of such significance until the rise of the Köprülüs in 1656 that the period came to be known as 'the Age of the Queen Mother'.[2] The ruling class by the early seventeenth century had come to be "dominated by factions of palace officials and janissaries, joined by high religious and legal scholars (*ulema*) who formed patronage networks of their own."[3] One clear example, which demonstrates the weakening of the sultanate and increasing influence of factions, is the 1622 deposing by the janissaries of Osman II after he had attempted to curb their influence by establishing a new army. In addition to increased political factionalism, the empire was faced with the economic consequences of war, devaluation in their currency, and other social problems.

These challenges, as some scholars have argued, marked the beginnings of the decline of the Ottoman State that lasted from the end of the reign of Süleyman I, the 'Magnificent', who ruled the Empire from 1520 to 1566. Under Süleyman I the Ottoman Empire conquered domains in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, increasing the power, wealth, territory and prestige of the empire. In addition to military success, the empire under Süleyman I also experienced

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[1] Christopher K Neumann, "Political and diplomatic developments," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey, Volume 3: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839,* ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 46-47.
[2] Neumann, *Political*, 48.
[3] Neumann, *Political*, 46.

developments within the empire such as the codification of the *kanun i-Osmani*, which marked the development of single code of law that was separate from but subordinate to the *Şeriat* law (Holy or Sacred Law) of Islam, as well as massive building projects within Istanbul and other parts of the empire, including the majestic Süleymaniye mosque in Istanbul. Yet after this period of expansion and development, challenges arose which threatened to ruin these advancements.

Daniel Goffman cites several Ottoman writers, statesmen and scholars who comment on "the inadequacies of their state, all [warning] of a rise in corruption, a decline in lawfulness, and a failure of leadership in the post-Süleymanic empire."[4] Furthermore, "these authors believed that the imperial household became even more dysfunctional in the decades after this sultan's death"[5] and that

> "… it was principally a deterioration of leadership that diluted power, engendered corruption, bankrupted the treasury, dragged the empire into ruinous wars, devastatingly inflated the currency, diluted and undermined the janissary corps, and generally enfeebled the Ottoman state."[6]

These growing economic, social, moral and political troubles prompted individuals and institutions to respond with solutions and reforms that would prevent not only the degeneration and decline of the empire and restore its greatness, but also alleviate the sufferings of Ottoman society.

There were those who looked to and found in religion, specifically Islam, the explanation and the solution for the social, political and moral degradation in Ottoman society. They argued that the cause of the decline was the deviation from the Islam of the Prophet and his companions, the pristine form of Islam, that occurred as a result of the acceptance of innovation (*bid`a*), non-Islamic practices, the permissiveness of religious observance and disregard of the *Shari`a*.

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[4] Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 112.
[5] Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire,* 112.
[6] Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire,* 113.

According to this fundamentalist[7] critique, the solution lay in the revival and renewal of traditional, pure Islam and that such an Islamic revival would enable the empire and society to be strengthened and restored. If heresy continued to be tolerated by the society, government, and *ulema*, societal decline would continue until final destruction came.

One prominent theologian who articulated this view in the sixteenth century was Birgivi Mehmed Efendi. Birgivi Mehmed, the son of a teacher, was a fundamentalist theologian from Balikesir, a province of western Anatolia, who taught at a *medrese* in Birgi.[8] Katib Çelebi records that "[s]tudents came from all around, and he became much sought-after, a man of great ability and spiritual worth. Sometimes he preached, sometimes he taught, ever zealous to revive the Sunna of the Prophet by enjoining right and forbidding wrong."[9] His zealousness to revive the *Sunna* and for the strict application of *Shari`a*, as well as enjoin right and forbid wrong (*amr bil ma'ruf wa nahy an il-munkar*), were the main tenets of his teachings. Birgivi believed and argued in his preaching and writing for society to return to the Islam of the Prophet, free from the harmful and degenerative effects of innovation and heresy that had come to characterize popular Islamic practice in the empire. In his two most popular writings, *Risala-i Birgivi* and the longer *Tariqat al-Muhammadiyya*, Birgivi sought to defend and free the *Qur`an, Shari`a* and *Sunna* from what he saw as *bid'a*. His *Risala* was the most widely read, quoted and followed tract[10], and "attempted to eliminate ambiguities of faith or belief by providing the community with a catechism of fundamentals in simple prose."[11] He also discussed his views on pious living, being

[7] In this paper the term fundamentalist will refer to an individual or group advocating for the reforming of Islam by reviving and returning to the traditional form of Islam as practiced by the Prophet and his Companions, and the primacy of the *Qur'an* and *Sunna* as understood and interpreted by them. The term fundamentalist does not necessarily equate to violence, however, where violence does come about as a result of a fundamentalist position it will be explained as such. The terms reformist and revivalist will be used interchangeably with fundamentalist in this paper.
[8] Katib Chelebi, *The Balance of Truth*, trans. G. L. Lewis (London: 1957), 128.
[9] Chelebi, *Balance*, 129.
[10] Madeline C. Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema 1600-1800* (Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988), 144.
[11] Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 144.

careful to point out what practices and beliefs constituted *bid`a* and should be avoided.[12] While teaching these views to his followers, he also sought to impart them on those in power, even going as far as meeting with Grand Vizier Soqullu Mehmed Pasha and urging him "to put an end to the degeneration which was threatening the moral life of Islamic society."[13] These fundamentalist teachings and works of Birgivi Mehmed would come to inspire a student of some of his disciples, Kadizade Mehmed, and form the foundation of an Islamic reformist movement that appeared in seventeenth century Istanbul that bears his name.

The Kadizadeli movement, using as a foundation the works of Birgivi and Kadizade, attempted to gain political influence in their quest to implement Islamic reform. They sought to free Islam from *bid`a* and call the empire back to the strict observance of *Shari`a* and the *Qur`an*. In order to accomplish their reformist program they actively fought and preached against what they perceived as heresy and against whom they viewed as propagating it. While they sought to actively enjoin right and forbid wrong, they unevenly applied their strict orthodoxy, indirectly challenging the janissaries, *ulema* or the Sultan while singling out and directly confronting with violence and verbal attacks certain Sufi orders and individuals associated with them or those practicing innovation.

In this paper I will explore the basic tenets of the Kadizadeli movement and how they found their expression in the political and religious arena during the three episodes of Kadizadeli influence in 17th century Istanbul. Furthermore, I will discuss the ways in which they were able to gain influence in the Ottoman government and how the ultimate successes and failures of the movement depended greatly upon whether they were perceived as contributing to the social order of the empire or threatening that order with their fundamentalist demands and excessive actions. Seeking political and social influence, the movement naturally faced competition from other interest groups and centers of power, many of whose views the Kadizadelis held in contempt and

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[12] Necati Özturk, "Islamic Orthodoxy among the Ottomans in the Seventeenth Century with Special Reference to the Qadizade Movement" (Ph.D. disseration, University of Edinburgh, 1981), 140.
[13] Özturk, *Islamic Orthodoxy*, 139.

vice versa. Madeline Zilfi and several other scholars[14], following available historical writings from the time, frame Kadizadeli radicalism in the light of competition for religious and political recognition, as well as careerism, minimizing the role or influence of religious belief. While not necessarily incorrect, I think more emphasis needs to be placed on the fundamentalist religious belief and theology of the Kadizadelis as the primary influencing factor in their sometimes violent campaign to implement their reformed version of Islam.

The first chapter will discuss Kadizade Mehmed, his beliefs, his rise to influence, his relationship to Murad IV and his competition with Sivasi Efendi, a Sufi sheykh. The second chapter will discuss the second wave of Kadizadeli activism organized around Üstüvani Efendi, a preacher from Damascus, and a group of Kadizadeli preachers who gained political influence during the reigns of Ibrahim I and Murad IV. The third chapter will discuss the final period of Kadizadeli influence under Vani Mehmed Efendi, focusing on his influence in the palace over the Valide Sultan, Sultan Murad IV and the Grand Vizier Fazil Ahmed Koprulu.

[14] See Madeline Zilfi's book *The Politics of Piety* and her article "The Kadizadelis: Discordant Revivalism in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul" and Suraiya Faroqhi's *Subjects of the Sultan* for this view. Daniel Goffman's *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* and Bernard Lewis' *Istanbul and the Civilization of the Ottoman Empire* suggest in passing that the theological dimension played more of a role beyond personal rivalries and institutional competition. Necati Özturk's doctoral dissertation *Islamic Orthodoxy among the Ottomans in the Seventeenth Century with Special Reference to the Qadizade Movement* focuses extensively and almost exclusively on the religious and theological aspect of the Kadizadeli Movement.

Chapter 1

Kadizade Mehmed: The fight against the Sufis and for political influence

Kadizade Mehmed, the man who would become the leader of the fundamentalist movement bearing his name, was born in the town of Balikesir to a Kadi. As a young child in Balikesir, Kadizade Mehmed studied under the disciples of Birgivi Mehmed[15], where he likely learned from the works of Birgivi in addition to his Qur'anic and hadith studies. After a period of time, he moved to Istanbul where he became a student and teacher under Tursunzade at a *medrese* there.[16] At this time, the number of years of study in the Ottoman *medrese* system was reduced due to the deteriorating social conditions, which had influenced more people to pursue a religious career.[17] The increase in the number of individuals with religious credentials was not accompanied by a similar increase in the number of professional positions available, thus competition for positions resulted. In such an environment, success in finding employment as a jurist, teacher or Friday preacher was not only dependent on personal knowledge and talent, but also on whether or not they became the benefactor of an influential patron.[18] Upon completing his studies, Kadizade began his career as a preacher in Istanbul, but soon moved on from the path of preaching to pursue Sufism.

Katib Çelebi, in *The Balance of Truth*, records that Kadizade "chose the career of a Sufi sheykh, entering the service of `Umar Efendi, Sheykh of the Terjuman lodge (*tekke*), and occupying himself with spiritual purification."[19] Thus, Kadizade seemingly abandoned the puritanical teachings of Mehmed Birgivi and pursued a Sufi education under the direction of `Umar Efendi, a Khalwati sheykh. His decision to join a Sufi *tekke* and become a follower of the

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[15] Chelebi, *Balance*, 132.
[16] Chelebi, *Balance*, 132.
[17] Özturk , *Islamic Orthodoxy*, 146.
[18] Suraiya Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000), 64.
[19] Chelebi, *Balance*, 132.

Khalwati *tariqa* was not unique for the time, as Sufism during the late 16th and 17th century was growing in influence within the Ottoman Empire.

The growing influence of Sufism, particularly the influence of the Khalwati order, was, according to Özturk, due to the existence of discontent and suffering in the social, economic and political realms, as well as a general disdain for official prohibitions on accepted on the use of coffee and tobacco, two substances used widely by Sufis.[20] Specifically,

> "The growth of social evils, such as bribery, corruption, nepotism and favouritism within the established ruling institutions, was responsible for the emergence of a tendency for the people to seek out alternative social frameworks within which to acquire education and express themselves spiritually and intellectually. The existence of insecurity created by the economic crises and social disturbances of this period encouraged spiritual values which brought people to the door of the [*tekke*]."[21]

This environment of discontent drew people to Sufi mysticism, which offered people an escape from the suffering of daily life and a direct connection to God. Within the Ottoman realm, the Khalwati, Mevlevi, Bektashi and Naqshabandi orders were the largest and most influential of the Sufi *tariqas*.[22] Many of the leaders of these *tariqas* enjoyed the patronage and protection of members of the Ottoman ruling elite, from princes to the *ulema*. One clear example is of the Bektashi order, which was connected to the Janissaries, giving them a relationship that gave them access and influence to the central government.[23] Even as their influence and following grew, the Sufi *tariqas* were treated skeptically by some in the religious establishment, who questioned their adherence to orthodoxy, as well as by the Ottoman government, who were suspicious of their potential ability to inspire political action against the existing order.[24] Perhaps in reaction to "the dubious orthodoxy"[25] of the Khalwatis and a rekindling of the strict orthodox beliefs imparted to him by Birgivi's disciples, Kadizade, left the Khalwati and Sufism behind, finding that it "did not

[20] Özturk, *Islamic Orthodoxy*,102.
[21] Özturk, *Islamic Orthodoxy*, 102.
[22] Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan*, 67.
[23] Bernard Lewis, *Istanbul and the Civilization of the Ottoman Empire* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 156.
[24] Lewis, *Istanbul*, 154-58.
[25] Lewis, *Istanbul*, 159.

suit his temperament"[26], and returned to teaching, soon to become the Sufis "most virulent adversary."[27]

Kadizade returned to teaching and preaching at the Murad Pasha mosque in Istanbul, where he taught for many years.[28] He was then promoted to the position of Friday preacher at Sultan Selim mosque, one of the prestigious imperial mosques, where he replaced Fadl Birgivi Efendi, the son of Birgivi Mehmed.[29] From this point, his career as a Friday preacher within the imperial mosque system flourished, as he would also be appointed at Beyazid, Süleymaniye and, finally, Aya Sofya, the summit of the imperial mosque system. He was "renowned as a preacher and teacher"[30] and "was a good and effective speaker whose sermons never failed to move his hearers. For the most part his words were an encouragement to the people to acquire religious knowledge, and an exhortation to strive to escape ignorance."[31] Inspired by Birgivi, Kadizade Mehmed exhorted the people to follow the true Islam as it had been at the time of the Prophet, free from deviations and harmful innovations. These heretical innovations were harmful to the *Umma* and threatened to lead it into sin and unbelief, a state that the orthodox Kadizadelis could not allow to exist. For Kadizade and his followers, "deviation flowed from the influence of the Sufi orders…If the Sufi orders were not tamed…the entire community would be plunged into unbelief."[32] Thus, for Kadizade and his followers, the Sufi orders represented the gravest threat to Islam itself, and believing in the Qur'anic injunction to enjoin right and forbid wrong, Kadizade focused his attention in his sermons and in his writings on the innovative and heretical practices of the Sufis.

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[26] Chelebi, *Balance*, 132.
[27] Madeline C. Zilfi, "The Kadizadelis: Discordant Revivalism in Seventeenth Century Istanbul," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 45, no. 42 (October1986): 253.
[28] Chelebi, *Balance*, 132.
[29] Chelebi, *Balance*, 132-33.
[30] Chelebi, *Balance*, 133.
[31] Chelebi, *Balance*, 135
[32] Zilfi, *Discordant Revivalism*, 254.

Kadizade and other preachers aligned with him constantly opposed the Sufis, particularly the Khalwatis and their Sheykh, Sivasi Efendi, speaking out against their beliefs, calling them heretical and accusing them of *bid'a*, as well as by encouraging their followers to actively enjoin right and forbid wrong by confronting them if they witnessed them in their unbelief. On about every issue that Kadizade argued was innovation, Sivasi Efendi, took the opposing viewpoint.[33] In his sermons, Kadizade preached against shaking hands with and bowing to people; pilgrimages to the tombs of saints; bribery; drinking coffee; using tobacco; those who claimed the parents of the prophet died believers; and innovation in general. Kadizade also criticized specific Sufi rituals such as the *dhikr* ceremony, dancing, singing˙ and music. These practices should not be tolerated according to Kadizade, even if they were only confined to the *tekkes*. What enraged Kadizade and his followers even more was when Khalwati and other Sufi sheykhs who served as mosque preachers brought these heretical practices into the mosques, corrupting the sacred space of the mosque and leading the faithful astray. For the Kadizadelis and those sympathetic to many of their arguments, such a blatant disregard for orthodoxy could not be tolerated. In addition to preaching against and confronting what he viewed as a threat to Islam itself, Kadizade taught that it was a religious duty, incumbent upon a true Muslim, to actively enjoin right and forbid wrong in defense of the faith, calling on those who practiced *bid'a* to renounce it and recommit themselves to the true faith or be faced with punishment.[34] In general, Kadizade preached for the purification of Islam and actively sought to win the support of the people of Istanbul and the government in rooting out heresy and reviving Islam.

Kadizade began his ascent through the imperial mosque system during a time of great political instability and intrigue. In 1622, the janissaries had assassinated Sultan Osman II and Mustafa I was placed on the throne once again, replacing the nephew who had deposed him in 1618. However, he himself was deposed again a year later due to his inability to rule and was

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[33] Chelebi, *Balance*, 133.
[34] See Chelebi's *The Balance of Truth* where he devotes a chapter to almost all the points of the Kadizadeli program.

replaced by the young Murad IV. During his early rule, his mother wielded great political influence, essentially ruling the empire by proxy. Under her rule, corruption spread and the struggle for influence sometimes became violent, culminating with the killing of the Grand Vizier in 1631, after the Janissaries stormed the palace. This was a turning point for Murad IV, who began to assert his power as a result of a fear of losing it. At this time he began his fight to root out the corruption that had grown in the early years of his rule and looked to eradicate any challenges to his rule and any seditious plots, creating a reign of terror that sought to eliminate factionalism and consolidate his power. It was at this time that Kadizade Mehmed was appointed to the Friday preaching position at Aya Sofya, and when he and his fundamentalist message found an ally in Sultan Murad IV.

For years Kadizade had been preaching against Sufi excesses and other social evils such as bribery, smoking tobacco, wine, and coffee. In addition to his calls to shut down Sufi lodges, he also called on the Sultan to shut down taverns and coffeehouses, as well as ban the use of the above-mentioned substances. The Sultan, seeking to assert his power and stave off potential rebellion, looked favorably on these calls of prohibition, as they would provide him with the cover of religious justification for political actions. "For Murad, taverns and coffeehouses were hatcheries for sedition. Coffee, tobacco, and wine were dangerous facilitators of public assembly and shared confidences."[35] Thus, the Sultan ordered the closing of coffeehouses and taverns, even destroying some, and banned the consumption of wine and tobacco, threatening with death anyone who broke the imperial order. In fact, Katib Çelebi records

> "…the late Sultan Murad IV, towards the end of his reign, closed down the coffeehouses in order to shut the gate of iniquity, and also banned smoking, in consequence of fire. People being undeterred, the imperial anger necessitated the chastisement of those who, by smoking, committed the sin of disobedience to the imperial command. Gradually His Majesty's severity increased, and so did the people's desire to smoke, in accordance with the saying, 'Men desire what is forbidden', and many thousands of men were sent to the abode of nothingness."[36]

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[35] Zilfi, *Discordant Revivalism*, 257.
[36] Chelebi, *Balance*, 51.

The strict enforcement of these Sultanic decrees resulted in the execution of thousands of people but on the whole proved to be widely ineffective as the number of smokers allegedly increased. Furthermore, the limited scope of the imperial edicts must be noted. The prohibitions of Murad IV failed to extend beyond the confines of Istanbul, and even still, were disregarded in private within the city itself. Moreover, the edicts themselves were political actions meant to suppress rebellious subjects, not the attempts of the Sultan to ban heretical innovations and impose stricter Islamic orthodoxy as favored by Kadizade.

The assertion that Sultan Murad was motivated more by political considerations than religious convictions is supported by the fact that he only implemented those aspects of the Kadizade program which would benefit him and also protected the Sufis from Kadizadeli fanatic vigilantism. Politically speaking, this was not a difficult decision to make as the various Sufi orders commanded a vast amount of influence amongst the people and royal elite within the empire. Murad's sympathies for the Sufis were demonstrated through his actions such as his appointment of Zekeriyazade Yahya as Şeyülislam who was known for his loyal support of Sufi *tekkes*.[37] Additionally, Murad also extended his patronage to Kadizade's greatest rival, the Khalwati Sheykh Sivasi Efendi, bestowing generous honors upon both of them. Murad was also welcoming to other Sufi sheykhs and seems to have no personal or religious objections to Sufi practices, as long as the Sufi orders remained politically benign. Thus, Murad played the Sufi orders and Kadizadelis off one another in order to check the political power of both groups in relation to the throne.

With the death of Kadizade in 1635 the first wave of Kadizadeli influence passed into the background. The movement had lost its charismatic leader, founder and teacher, and though a network of Kadizade preachers and sympathizers continued to exist, preaching against innovation and Sufi practices, they would lack a dynamic leader who would inspire them and reassert their lost influence for over a decade.

[37] Zilfi, *Discordant Revivalism*, 258.

Chapter 2

Ibrahim the Weak and Mehmed the Child: The Return of the Kadizadelis under Üstüvani Mehmed

Murad IV died in 1640 and was succeeded by his brother Ibrahim, who was believed to be mentally unfit for the position and more concerned with living an extravagant lifestyle surrounded by the women of the Imperial Harem, taking little interest in the affairs of state. Ibrahim's lack of interest and unfitness for governing contrasted sharply with the efforts of centralization and reassertion of the power of the Sultanate undertaken by Murad IV. His failure to consolidate the gains made by Murad in centralizing authority allowed the various factions, still ever present within the Ottoman system, to regain, reassert and rule for their own benefit, reintroducing instability within the ruling structure of the Ottoman state. This instability showed itself in many areas of Ottoman political life, including the

> "strife between two queen mothers… frantic sequences of appointments and depositions in high state offices; venality; nepotism; favouritism that allowed redoubtable figures…to gain substantial influence; financial difficulties; and, finally, a less than successful war against Venice."[38]

The political volatility during the rule of Ibrahim would also be present in during the early rule of Mehmed IV, who succeeded Ibrahim on throne in 1648 after he had been deposed in a coup led by the Şeyülislam and murdered on the order of the Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha. The chaotic nature of politics at this time provided the Kadizadelis with an opportunity to gain more influence and power than they had held during the time of Kadizade Mehmed.

Upon the death of Kadizade Mehmed the movement entered into a transitional period during which the students and followers of Kadizade continued to preach against the dangers of innovation generally and against Sufi practices specifically as individuals. However, it would not be until the later part of the rule of Ibrahim I that a leader would arise from within the movement, behind whom the disparate elements of the movement could unite and continue their struggle as a

[38] Neumann, *Political*, 49.

group. This man was Üstüvani Mehmed, a preacher from Damascus, who had come to Istanbul and through his charismatic preaching and teaching became recognized as the leader of the Kadizade movement.

Under the new leadership of Üstüvani, the Kadizade movement renewed their fight against the Sufis with increased fervor and intensity, actively seeking to confront them with violence and seeking to gain the support of state in their campaign to root out *bid'a.* This incitement to violence and active persecution of the Sufis, specifically the Khalwatis, went beyond the intense verbal and written arguments witnessed during the time of Kadizade, becoming increasingly hostile and aggressive.[39] Together with inciting their followers to violence and increasing the intensity of their rhetoric against the Sufis, the Kadizade movement under Üstüvani also sought to gain influence in the Ottoman court in the hopes of securing official backing for their persecution of heretics. In this pursuit, they were more successful than Kadizade had ever been.

Üstüvani efforts to secure influence in the Ottoman court began after he had gained the support and "following among the armed servitor guardsmen of the imperial palace…who so often provided the firepower behind succession struggles."[40] Using his position as the regular preacher of the palace corpsmen, Üstüvani was able to gain the attention and eventual patronage of palace *aghas*, whose positions of influence within the Ottoman government enabled them to protect Üstüvani. Empowered this new status, Üstüvani and his followers gained confidence in their ability to carry out a violent campaign against the Sufis and used their pulpits to incite their followers to violence against the Sufis and any one who visited one of their *tekkes*. They encouraged their followers to actively and violently enjoin right and forbid wrong amongst their fellow Muslims by threatening with death anyone who practiced *bid'a* and refused to recommit themselves to Islam, for such a person was an infidel. Interestingly, one such Kadizade preacher

[39] Özturk, *Islamic Orthodoxy*, 218.
[40] Zilfi, *Discordant Revivalism*, 258.

was a Sufi from the Naqshbandi order, who held the position of Friday preacher at the Suleymaniye mosque, named ‘Osman Bosnevi.[41]

Bosnevi was one of the principal spokesmen for the Kadizade movement at this time and his support for the Kadizade program is unique because he was a member of one of the major Sufi orders. The Naqshbandi were known for their stricter adherence to Islamic orthodoxy and to *Shari`a*, deeming many of the practices of the other major orders excessive. While viewing the excesses of the Khalwatis and Mevlevis with condescension, they did not actively seek to forbid their practices. The only known exception to this, we learn from Na`ima, is `Osman Bosnevi, who, along with other Kadizade preachers, “mounted a campaign of disapprobation and rebuke against the Sufis, even resorting to accusation of unbelief (*takfir*).”[42] Otherwise, the Naqshbandi stayed out of the conflict between the other Sufi orders and the followers of Kadizade.[43]

With preachers like Üstüvani and Bosnevi, the Kadizadeli movement mounted a serious campaign of hostility against the Sufis and anyone who supported them from the pulpits and made a series of attempts to secure the backing of the government. In 1651, the Kadizadelis requested a *ferman* from Grand Vizier Ahmed Pasha, authorizing the destruction of a Khalwati lodge. The Grand Vizier approved the request and the Kadizadelis proceeded to attack the *tekke*, completely destroying it and attacking individuals who were inside. Inspired by their success and using the *ferman*, which they broadly interpreted to justify their attacks on any Sufi *tekke*, the Kadizadeli mob turned their sights on another Khalwati lodge. This attack was thwarted however by members of the lodge, with the support of some Janissaries, who came to its defense in the face of the Kadizadeli threat. Recognizing the potential for more armed confrontation and social disorder, the Grand Vizier issued another *ferman* that reversed the order and forbade people from

[41] Dina Le Gall, *A Culture of Sufism: Naqshbandis in the Ottoman World, 1450-1700* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 151.
[42] Le Gall, *Culture of Sufism*, 152.
[43] Le Gall, *Culture of Sufism*, 151-54.

attacking Sufi lodges.[44] Although suffering a minor setback, the Kadizadelis were not deterred in their efforts to combat Sufi heresy and took their case to the Şeyülislam himself.

The Kadizadelis approached the Şeyülislam Bahai Mehmed and requested that he issue a fatwa condemning and declaring illegal the Sufis' music and rhythmic dancing. Bahai Mehmed agreed with the case the Kadizadelis had presented and issued a fatwa against the Sufis. With the fatwa in hand, the Kadizadelis began to threaten Sufi leaders with violence and death. Na`ima himself records a letter that Üstüvani sent to a Sufi sheykh, which stated:

> "It has become an obligation to stop you. Since you have been performing [*raqs*] and [*dawaran*], we will raid your [*tekke*], murder you and your followers, dig up the foundations of your tekke to the depth of a few [*arshin*] and pour its earth into the sea. So long as this degree of care is not shown, it will not be lawful to preform the [*salat*] in that place."[45]

The recipient of this letter promptly informed the Şeyülislam, who then demanded an accounting from Üstüvani himself and promptly reversed his decision. While his decision had not exceeded the scope of previous condemnations of Sufi excesses from prior Şeyülislams, the radical and violent application that sought to terrorize was a departure from simple condemnations but tolerance for the practices. This instance highlights one of the challenges posed to the religious authorities. The *ulema* had an interest in maintaining the social order, an important element in Islam, which fears chaos, but also as an organ of the state apparatus. However, their other important role was to uphold Islamic orthodoxy, which included reigning in the innovative practices of the Sufis, something that the Kadizadelis challenged them to do and accused them of failing at.

While the Kadizadelis continued to preach, incite violence and attack the Sufis, the Sufis remained peaceful, preferring to respond to Kadizadeli violence on an intellectual level and with other means of peaceful resistance to garner support for their position. Around 1653, two Khalwati Sufis, Kürd Mehmed and Tatar Imam, separately published two intellectual critiques of

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[44] Özturk, *Islamic Orthodoxy*, 238-39, and Zilfi, *Politics of Piety,* 142.
[45] Na`ima, V, 57 as quoted in Özturk, I*slamic Orthodoxy*, 240.

Birgivi Mehmed's work, *Tariqat al-Muhammadiyye,* which attempted to refute Birgivi's theology and criticized Birgivi himself. For the Kadizadelis, this was a step too far, as they had come to regard Birgivi's works as inviolable and beyond criticism. Instead of responding the intellectual challenge with extended argument and writings of their own, the Kadizadelis began calling for the execution of both writers, as well as appealed to the Şeyülislam and to the Sultan to intervene in the matter. Their calls for execution and physical intimidation were enough to cause Kürd Mehmed to flee Istanbul, while Tartar Imam remained to face the Kadizadeli wrath.[46]

Their first appeal to the Şeyülislam for both his condemnation and order of execution was ignored, prompting them to seek the influence of the Sultan himself on the matter. In their appeal to the Sultan, the Kadizadelis claimed that these works, specifically that of Tatar Imam, contained heretical pieces of writing and that questioning Birgivi's interpretation of the traditions of the Prophet amounted to an attack on the foundations of Islam itself. Thus, the Sultan and the *ulema*, the trusted guardians of Islam, could not let these opinions stand since they threatened the core of Islam and the belief of the *umma* itself. The Sultan gave into the arguments of the Kadizadelis and ordered the *ulema* to meet, under the leadership of the Şeyülislam, to debate the case and issue a ruling. The *ulema* found in favor of the Kadizade position and officially repudiated the works of Tartar Imam and Kürd Mehmed, as well as issued a warning to them to not undertake such activity ever again. Thus, the Kadizadelis, through their political connections and influence, had restored the good name of Birgivi and his works and guarded him against further criticism.[47]

While the Kadizadelis had effectively used their political connections to fight the Sufis, they still remained preoccupied with confronting them with physical violence and not intellectual debate. The militant posture of the movement exemplified by its aggressive intolerance, both verbally and physically, is what came to characterize the Kadizade movement in this period. This aggressiveness made them impatient and caused them frustration when their programs were not

[46] Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 146.
[47] For more details see Özturk, *Islamic Orthodoxy*, 245-50; Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 143-46.

implemented. By 1656, their impatience had grown over the failure of the Ottoman state to implement fundamentalist religious reforms, inspiring them to make a final call for the elimination of *bid`a*, the destruction of Sufi *tekkes* and Sufism itself. From their pulpits, the Kadizadelis attacked the Grand Vizier and the Ottoman administration, and incited their followers to take up arms against the Sufis.[48] What they demanded was a revolution in the religious affairs of the state and it would begin with an attack on the Sufis and their institutions in Istanbul. However, Köprülü Mehmed and the *ulema*, which met the organized militants at the Fatih mosque, the unofficial headquarters of the Kadizadeli movement, with a ruling declaring their "claims to orthodoxy false and their actions liable to punishment", stopped the implementation of their plan.[49] After preventing this outburst of radical Kadizadeli violence, Köprülü Mehmed had Üstüvani Mehmed, along with several other Kadizadeli followers, arrested and banished to Cyprus.[50] Other Kadizadelis were warned to keep quiet and cease their incitement.

With the banishment of Üstüvani Mehmed to Cyprus, the Kadizadeli movement was once again deprived of a charismatic leader around whom the movement could unify. Furthermore, they had upset the political order in such a way that it was to their benefit to remain in the background of religious affairs until more favorable conditions emerged. The movement would not have to wait long, as they would once again return to influence Istanbul more than ever before.

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[48] Özturk, *Islamic Orthodoxy*, 261-265.
[49] Zilfi, *Discordant Revivalism*, 262.
[50] Zilfi, *Discordant Revivalism*, 262.

Chapter 3

The Grand Vizier and His Personal Sheikh

By exiling several of the Kadizadeli leaders and effectively warning those that remained in Istanbul, Köprülü Mehmed had left the movement without a leader and neutralized the threat it posed to the public order. In his mission to restore order to the Empire, Köprülü Mehmed took on those groups he viewed as a challenge to his vision of stability and his wielding of power. After he had effectively constrained and checked Kadizadeli violence and behavior, Köprülü asserted his power over the Janissaries, Sipahis and provincial bandits, groups whose recent actions, particularly their violent behavior and participation in political intrigue, were a source of instability and unrest, both to the political system and society at large. Under the scrutiny of the Grand Vizier and lacking a dynamic leader, the Kadizadelis were careful to not act in a way that would antagonize those in government, which would have resulted in an even greater crackdown on their movement. While pragmatically restraining their activism, the Kadizadelis did not cease preaching their fundamentalist message and denouncing the innovations of the Sufi orders, nor did they end their verbal harassment of Sufis in the streets of Istanbul. This period of pragmatic behavior by the leaderless Kadizadelis did not last long, as the third episode of Kadizadeli influence in Istanbul and the palace would emerge upon the death of Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed in 1661.

In 1661, a fundamentalist preacher arrived in Istanbul from a province in Eastern Anatolia at the invitation of the new Grand Vizier, Fazil Ahmed. The two had become close friends when Fazil Ahmed was the provincial governor in the province of Erzurum in eastern Anatolia while his father, Köprülü Mehmed, was Grand Vizier.[51] This preacher, Mehmed ibn Bistam of Van, commonly known as Vani Mehmed, was a fundamentalist Islamic scholar and preacher who taught at a local mosque in Erzurum, the Lala Mustafa Pasha mosque. Vani Mehmed had made an impression on the young governor, "a former medrese student and an

[51] Zilfi, *Discordant Revivalism*, 263.

admirer of religious scholarship"[52], through his charismatic personality, instruction and knowledge of Islam. Fazil's admiration and regard for Vani Mehmed, both as a person and religious figure, would lead him to invite Vani to Istanbul when he became Grand Vizier following the death of his father. Upon his arrival in Istanbul, Vani set about his task of calling Ottoman leaders and society at large back to the pristine form of Islam that existed at the time of Muhammad, a message that he was able to spread from the very center of the Empire.

In Istanbul, Vani served as the spiritual guide to his friend Fazil Ahmed, advising him on matters of faith and state, as well as strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two. Fazil's high regard for Vani led him to introduce Vani Mehmed to Sultan Mehmed IV and the Valide Sultan. Both were impressed by Vani's teaching and countenance, and upon their request, became their personal sheykh, providing spiritual wisdom and instruction in the way of Islam when needed. His exclusive and unchallenged role as personal sheykh to both the Sultan and Grand Vizier provided Vani with a tremendous amount of power. This power granted him unfettered access to the top decision makers in the Ottoman state, allowing him to freely teach his doctrine and attempt to influence Fazil and Mehmed IV in the way he saw fit, imparting his fundamentalist vision of Islam directly, unimpeded by opposing views. While enjoying direct access in the palace court, Vani Mehmed also spread his message to the public as Friday preacher at the newly constructed Valide Mosque.[53] From his pulpit, Vani, himself a gifted preacher like Kadizade Mehmed and Üstüvani Mehmed, gave rousing sermons and calls for the active reformation of Islam as it was practiced in the Ottoman Empire. His charismatic leadership and fundamentalist message inspired the followers of Kadizade, who rallied to him as the new leader of the movement.

Vani and the Kadizadelis attributed the loss of greatness, military defeats, economic difficulties to the social immorality that resulted from the "affiliation with and patronage of some

[52] Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 147.
[53] Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 147.

Sufi orders"[54], lax observance of the *Shari`a*, and broad acceptance of innovative practices that were heretical and led believers astray. Birgivi, whom he admired greatly[55], inspired his vision of Islam and, "as other Kadızadeli leaders had before him, so, too, did he aim to eradicate what he considered illicit Muslim behavior and to strengthen the rule of Islamic law (*şeriat*) and the way of Muhammad (*sünnet*) against innovation."[56] It was only through a renewal of Islamic values and observance that would stop and reverse the deterioration of Ottoman power and prestige. Framing his position in such a way allowed Vani to encourage the Grand Vizier and the Sultan to view themselves as the defenders of Islam, who were required to protect the *umma* from the threat of innovation and unbelief. As his predecessors had done, Vani Mehmed singled out the Sufis, particularly the Bektashis and Khalwatis, as the groups who represented the greatest threat by practicing the worst forms of innovation and exerting the most social and political influence.[57]

In their renewed war against the Sufis under the leadership of Vani Mehmed, the Kadizadelis resorted to their old tactics of actively enjoining right and forbidding wrong. From their pulpits they denounced the Sufis, accusing them of unbelief and failing to observe the Shari'a. Furthermore, they alleged that the Sufis encouraged unbelief within the Islamic *umma*, something that the orthodox Kadizadelis could not tolerate. With the permission of the Grand Vizier, Vani had a Bektashi lodge near Edirne associated with the Janissaries destroyed and its members scattered.[58] Prior to this, Vani had taken aim at the use of wine and tobacco, successfully forbidding the sale of wine within Istanbul in 1665 and ordering taverns and coffeehouses shut down. Furthermore, Vani succeeded in influencing the Ottoman court to ban the public performance of Sufi music and dancing, specifically the *sema*, *raks* and *devran*. The ban was imposed throughout Istanbul on all Sufi *tekkes*. In each of these instances, Vani

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[54]Marc David Baer, "The Great Fire of 1660 and the Islamization of Christian and Jewish Space in Istanbul," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36 (2004): 162.
[55] Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 148.
[56] Baer, *Great Fire*, 164
[57] Baer, *Great Fire*, 164
[58] Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 114.

Mehmed and the Kadizadelis were able to use the influence they possessed as a result of their direct access to chief decision makers within the Ottoman government. With each success they became more empowered and emboldened in their cause. Perhaps as a result of their empowered status, their deeply held religious convictions or a combination of both, the Kadizadelis under Vani Mehmed, while primarily targeting the Sufis, sought to expand their Islamizing reforms to other social groups within the Empire, notably non-Muslims.

Marc David Baer remarks on the expansion of the Kadizadeli program under Vani Efendi with regard to non-Muslims in an article discussing the Islamization of Istanbul after the great fire of 1660. While the Kadizadeli movement was concerned by Sufi innovation, they also worried about religious syncretism and the influence non-Muslims had over Muslims.

> "Thus, beginning in 1661, Vani Mehmed Efendi began to emphasize the sumptuary distinctions marking non-Muslims from Muslims. Social disorder and lack of social distinctions appeared to him to be the result of laxity and error in Muslims' religious beliefs and practices, and he believed that the high status of non-Muslims symbolized the corrupted nature of the body politic."[59]

This corruption of the body politic by non-Muslims was exhibited in two specific areas: the sale and consumption of wine, and the practice of Muslims holding communal prayers with non-Muslims.

While the singling out the Sufis for their tolerance and use of wine and alcohol, Vani viewed non-Muslims who freely sold and used alcohol, as they were legally allowed to do, as enablers and agents of moral corruption. Thus, when Vani Mehmed persuaded the Grand Vizier to forbid the sale of alcohol and close taverns within Istanbul, he had effectively attacked both the Sufis and non-Muslim minorities. [60] The ban on the sale of alcohol was expanded in 1670 to include consumption as a capital offense.[61] However, much like similar bans in the time of Kadizade Mehmed, the bans enjoyed limited success. In addition to this, Vani also protested

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[59] Baer, *Great Fire,* 164.
[60] Baer, *Great Fire*, 164.
[61] Paul Rycaut, *The History of the Turkish Empire from the Year 1623 to the Year 1677*. 2 vols. London: Printed by J.M. for J. Starkey, 1680. vol 2, 285-287.

against the saying of communal prayers, believing that such action corrupted the prayers of Muslims and implied the approval of faiths other than Islam itself.

In 1664, Vani specifically raised his objection after the Sultan issued a decree for communal prayers to be said for the success of the Ottoman army in the coming war with Austria. In issuing the decree, the Sultan was supported by the Şeyülislam but opposed by Vani Mehmed on the grounds that it was a corruption of Islam. The Şeyülislam, with the support of "a prominent Sufi sheykh"[62], argued that it was entirely appropriate and that prior precedence and practice showed this to be true. Vani Mehmed argued otherwise, convincing the Sultan to rescind his decree and the Şeyülislam "to recant his former opinion as erroneous."[63] While the Sultan's decision may have been influenced by the merits of Vani's argument, it is far more likely that Vani's unchallenged influence on the Sultan played a more important role in causing him to reverse his decision. Along with the annulment of the decree, the Sufi sheykh who supported the Şeyülislam was accused of deceiving him and sent into exile[64], while the Şeyülislam was criticized for failing to uphold the values of true Islam.[65]

The Kadizadelis, through Vani Mehmed, successfully used their close relationships with Grand Vizier Fazil Ahmed Pasha and Sultan Mehmed IV to gain their support in their campaign against bid'a and the implementation of their purified version of Islam. As mentioned earlier, Vani Mehmed had direct access to and enjoyed close relationships with the grand vizier and sultan. He advised them and guided them in Islamic matters and sought to shape their understanding of faith, bringing it into conformity with his. While he was concerned with their personal piety, Vani also sought to turn this personal piety into the active embracing of their role as leaders of the Islamic community and recapture the ghazi ethos of the past.

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62 Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 157.
63 Rycaut, *History*, vol 2, 154.
64 Rycaut, *History*, vol 2, 154.
65 Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 157.

The Ottoman state in the 17th century was confronted with many military challenges, that, while never directly threatening its rule, took their toll economically and socially. The Kadizadelis viewed the moral decay within the Ottoman state as the major cause behind the military defeats. Vani Mehmed encouraged the renewal of the *ghazi* ethos, promoting the various military campaigns throughout his period of influence in the Ottoman court. In prayers that he composed for the sultan, Vani Mehmed "depict[ed] the sultan as the defender of the domains of Islam, repelling threats to the empire…along with calls for reinvigorating Sunni Islam within the empire…emphasiz[ing] dynastic concern with shoring up its moral defenses, waging the jihad of the soul and the jihad of military campaign."[66] Thus, Vani Mehmed sought to encourage Sultan Mehmed IV, as well as the grand vizier, to become the defenders of Islam against the attacks of the infidels, specifically the Christian powers of Europe.

The recapturing of their Islamic *ghazi* identity framed the battles under Mehmed the IV in a more Islamic way. As Ottoman armies fought to conquer Crete from the Venetians they claimed they were fighting in the name of Islam against the infidels. In the Polish-Ottoman War, Vani Mehmed and Sultan Mehmed IV joined part of the military campaign on the front lines, as the Ottoman Empire sought to expand its domain and the domain of Islam.[67] The campaign against the Poles was followed with a war against Russia. Vani Mehmed joined the troops on the front lines and "played a key role in inciting the troops to fight. In the view of contemporary writers, his words may have been as important as Ottoman weapons in securing victory."[68] Through his fiery preaching, he inspired the soldiers of the Ottoman Empire to wage jihad against the infidels, fighting against them with all their might in the name of God and on behalf of the true faith, Islam. After accompanying the Ottoman armies into battle, Vani Mehmed set his sights on the largest Christian empire in Europe, the Habsburgs, and argued passionately for a military campaign to be waged against the Habsburgs once again.

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[66] Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam*, 150.
[67] Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam*, 170-71.
[68] Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam*, 172.

Vani Mehmed's desire for a renewed campaign against the Habsburgs complemented the desire and vision of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha, who had succeeded Fazil Ahmed as Grand Vizier in 1676.[69] Against the objections of some members of the Ottoman administration, notably the Şeyülislam, the Ottoman army went to war against the Habsburgs as Vani had argued for and Vani himself went out with the soldiers from Edirne, preaching to them and encouraging them on the path of jihad.[70] However, the war against Habsburgs ended in disaster with the Ottoman army being routed at Vienna in 1683. The severe loss of morale and anger that resulted from the defeat left many in the empire searching for people to blame. Those who had led the army into battle were removed from their positions or executed, and those who had supported going to war were also reprimanded. This included Vani Mehmed, who was exiled as a result of his passionate advocacy of the war. With Vani Mehmed banished and many Kadizadeli views discredited in the light of the defeat at Vienna, the movement faded into the background of Ottoman society, never to appear again.

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[69] Zilfi, *Poltics of Piety*, 157.
[70] Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam*, 213-14.

Conclusion

From the inception of the movement up to its demise, the Kadizadelis sought to implement their fundamentalist program of Islamic reform, based on the works of Mehmed Birgivi, by gaining social, religious and political influence. Through their preaching, violent activism and political influence they sought to purge Islam of innovative practices and call the Empire back to strict observance of the *Shari`a*, *Sunna* and *Qur`an*. They argued that the return to traditional Islam as practiced by the Prophet, free from the harmful effects of *bid`a*, would be the cure for the societal ills that plagued Ottoman society and for its decline as a political and military power. At no point in their existence did they deviate from this message, demonstrating remarkable continuity of thought and ideology over time and under different leaders.

Throughout their existence, the Kadizadelis had three periods of influence in the Ottoman state, led by Kadizade Mehmed, Üstüvani Mehmed, and Vani Mehmed Efendi respectively. In each successive period, the movement was able to expand its power and influence, the final period under the Vani Mehmed being the most influential Kadizadeli period. While they were able to find broad sympathy for their doctrines amongst the people, *ulema*, Ottoman political elite, and even the Sultans, the movement failed to gain a large enough following to really transform the practice of Islam in the Ottoman Empire. This was due in part to the radical nature of their doctrine, as well as their tendency to resort to violence to further their aims, an action which was anathema to Ottoman society at the time. Furthermore, the successes and failures of their movement depended greatly on whether they enjoyed the patronage of the ruling elite and were not viewed as a threat to civil order in the Empire.

Their austere form of Islam, propagated through fiery preaching and violent activism that sought to enjoin right and forbid wrong, naturally raised the ire of those who held opposing views or were the objects of Kadizadeli verbal and physical attacks. The Kadizadelis reserved most of their wrath for the various Sufi orders within the Ottoman realm and those that followed them but were also critical of the *ulema*, whom they accused of failing to uphold true Islam. The

Kadizadelis viewed many of the Sufi orders as corrupters of Islam who threatened to lead Muslims astray from true belief by practicing innovation. However, the many Sufi orders represented a significant force in the religious and political spheres of the State and were an integral element of popular Islam as it was practiced in the Ottoman Empire at the time. Since, according the Kadizadelis, many Sufi orders threatened Islam itself, they fought to eliminate their influence with a radical passion through preaching, intimidation and physical violence. However, while enjoying periods of relative support for their positions against the Sufis at various points during Kadizadeli influence, the Sufi orders were never fully defeated.

At the time the movement was widely derided not only by Sufis, but others within Ottoman society as well. The Kadizadelis were criticized at various times for being corrupt, provincial, anti-intellectual, arrogant, motivated by careerism and petty jealousy. Some modern scholars, citing the writings of those critical of the Kadizadeli movement, have come to characterize the movement as primarily motivated by careerism and a desire for personal recognition. However, in focusing on the harsh critiques of opponents of the Kadizadelis and not on the works and words of the Kadizadelis themselves, they fail to address the importance of religious conviction and belief as a significant motivating factor for Kadizadeli activism. While some of these accusations may have been true of certain individuals at certain times throughout the history of the movement, focusing on them causes one to miss the fact that for over six decades the movement was motivated by the same religious vision and sought to bring about a revival of Islam. They sought the transformation of Ottoman society through the renewal of Islam, purged from the innovative elements that had helped to bring about the decay of society.

This failure to assign a proper place to religious motivations and convictions in an analysis of the Kadizadeli movement leads to an incomplete understanding of the movement and raises many questions. This is mostly a result of the failure of most scholars[71] neglecting the works of Mehmed Birgivi, Kadizade Mehmed, Üstüvani Mehmed, and Vani Mehmed Efendi, or

[71] Necati Özturk and March David Baer are notable exceptions to this trend.

failing to give them equality of place with historical reports of the movement from Katib Çelebi, Mustafa Naima, and Sir Paul Rycaut. As a result of not integrating these works into their analysis, one is left with many questions. How was the movement able to maintain such continuity in their doctrine over an extended period of time with little deviation and increasing fervency if sincere and deep religious convictions did not play a significant motivating role? If gaining power and influence were ends in themselves, why would one join a fundamentalist movement rather than a more popular and influential Sufi order, even if opportunities to distinguish oneself were more plentiful within the fundamentalist camp? The Kadizadelis certainly competed with the Sufis for positions as mosque preachers; however, the ferocity of the competition was not simply over gaining employment. Rather, the intensity of the competition was due to the very real divide over each groups interpretation of Islam and the Kadizadeli view that many Sufis were heretics who threatened to lead pious Muslims into unbelief. This remained the Kadizadeli critique of the Sufis throughout their existence and in every period, they attempted to use whatever political power they gained to further their fundamentalist goals, propagate their doctrine, and fight the detrimental influence of the Sufi orders.

Looking ahead to the future, further research of the Kadizadelis, making use of the writings of the movement's influential leaders that is integrated with historical accounts, is needed. Those who may question the importance of studying a minor movement that was confined to Istanbul and ultimately failed in implementing its reformist agenda should pause and reconsider such a position. Any scholarly research into the history of Islamic reform movements and the development of political forms of Islam should include study of this neglected movement whose doctrines and thought not only echoed Islamic fundamentalist positions from the past but also a precursor to modern Islamic reformist positions. As Daniel Goffman states,

> "In important ways, they constituted a forerunner to Islamic reformers in later centuries who, whether Ottoman, Egyptian, Wahhabi, or Iranian, consistently have argued that the West has defeated Islamic states only because their ostensibly Muslim leaders have

> forgotten their religious roots. Bring back the Muhammedan state, they all argue, and Islam will again take up its leading rank in the world order."[72]

The similarities and differences between these Islamic reform movements are important for scholars who seek to understand the reformist trends within Islam. Furthermore, exploring the ideological origins of the Kadizadelis by examining the influence of the jurisprudence of the Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyya, as well as the role of Hanafi jurisprudence, on the writings and interpretations of Islam of Birgivi Mehmed and Kadizade Mehmed would be valuable in understanding the role of jurisprudence in shaping their ideology and beliefs. This could potentially open the door to comparisons of Taymiyya's intellectual influence on other Islamic reformist movements and Islamic fundamentalist positions. Perhaps new insights into the doctrinal development of Islamic fundamentalism will be gleaned from exploring the Kadizadeli movement in a more comprehensive fashion.

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[72] Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire*, 119.

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